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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LAKE SHORE MOTOR COACH LINES, INC.,
WASATCH MOTORS, INC., et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

SALT LAKE TRANSPORTATION COMPANY
and PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
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UTAH, et al.,

Defendants.
LEWIS BROS STAGES, INC., a corporation,
and BINGHAM STAGE LINES, a corporation,
Plaintiffs,
v.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH,
et al., and SALT LAKE TRANSPORTATION
COMPANY,
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CONTINENT AL BUS SYSTEM, INC., et al.,
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v.

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH,
et al., and SALT LAKE TRANSPORTATION
COMPANY,
Defendants. )

Case No. 10907

Case No. 10908

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS
CONTINENTAL BUS SYSTEM, INC., et al.,
STATEMEN11 OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an appeal from an Order of the Publc Service
Commission of the State of Utah which granted def Pndant, Salt Lake Transportation Company, a certificate of conveniPnce and necessity to operate as a common
n1otor carrier by motor vehicle for the transportation of
passengt•rs and their baggage in the same or separate
VPhiclPs, in charter operations, and in special operations
in :sight-::;t~eing or passenger tours; between all points and
1

places within a 26 mile radius of 8alt Lake City anrJ
within said arPa to all points and places therein, aniJ
return, over predetermim•d rontes and/or irrrgular
routes, excluding traffic originating or terminating al
Provo, Utah.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE
The Public Service Commission granted defendant,
Salt Lake Transportation Company, the authority sought
and issued Certificate of Convenience and Necessity No.
538-Sub. 5.
Petition for Rehearing and Reconsideration was filed
by this plaintiff in a timely manner and rehearing "~'
denied by the Public Service Commission.
These actions of the Commission have been appealeu
directly to this Court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
This appeal seeks to have the lawfulness of thf
original Order and Order on Rehearing of the C01mni~
sion inquired into, determined, annulled and set aside.
PRELIMINARY MATTERS
We will refer to the plaintiffs, Continental Bm
System, Inc., American Bus Lines, Inc., Denver-Sult
Lake-Pacific Stages collectively as "Continental"; <l•
fendant, Public Service Cornmisson of Utah, as "Cont
mssion"; and defendant, Salt Lake Transportaton Corn
pany, as "Salt Lake Transportation."
2

With fow exceptions we shall set forth only the
facts as they directly pertain to Continental's case, recog11iz,rng Uiat other plaintiffs, viz: Lake Shore Motor Coach
Lines, d al., Lewis Brothers Stages, Inc., et al., are parliPs to this proceeding and will be filing separate Briefs.
do nrge that the case must be considered on the
<'ntire Ht'eonl and although we do not cite separately
the farts (lr issues of other parties, we nevertheless
incorporat1> th(~ir statements and arguments herein by
reference and asst rt reliance upon them in part for the
settmg aside of the Commission's Order in this case.
w,~

1

STATEMENT OF FAcr:rs
In N ovemher of 1965 Salt Lake Transportation filed
nn Application for a Certificate of Convenience and
N1.>cessit)' before the Commission. It sought authority to
uperate as a common motor carrier of passengers and
baggage in intrastate commerce and attached to its Application a ''Statement of Financial Condition" and a scheduJe of its equipment (R. 600-604). It proposed to operate
as a <:ommon carrier for passengers and their baggage in
the sauw or separate vehicles, in special operations, in
sight~seeing or pleasure tours, between all points and
tilacc-s in Davis, Morgan, Salt Lake, Utah, Tooele, Sumrnit and -Wasatch Counties; and from said counties to
0tll pornts and placPs in the State of Utah, and return,
Qi-(·1 pn'dPt~·rmined routes and/or irregular routes and
ei;r~rnte nnder the name of Salt Lake Transportation or
f1-ray l ,ine Motor Tours.

3

At the time of hearing, it amended its application
restrictively, so as to provide that the sc•rvices reforn·d
to would be performed betwt>n all points and vlace:
within a 26 mile radius of the city limits of Salt Lakr
City, Utah and from said radial area to all points anr)
places in the State of Utah and return over predet~r
mined routes and/or irregular routes and that the 2
miles would be calculated on an air line basis (R. 25-2GJ
1

;

Continental, along with other common carriers, 1rn 1
tested the Application.
Continental is a common carrier doing business i1t
both interstate and intrastate commerce and operate'
in the State of Utah. The Commission took notice ot
Continental's operating authority (R. 507) which is dr
fined in the Order (R. 622). Continental holds authorih
to operate charter round trips originating on U. S. Higl1
way 91 in Salt Lake City south and between Provo allil
the Deer Creek Damsite, which is located between Pron1
and Heber City. It can also operate round trip chark
service from Salt Lake City on U. S. Highway 40 we1
to the Utah-Nevada line and from the Utah-Wyomint
state line on the north to the Utah-Arizona state line 01~
the south from U. S. Highway 91. It is further author
ized to conduct round trip charter trips from U. S.
Highway 40 between Salt Lake City and the Utah-Colo
rado state line or as an alternate route from U. S. High
way 91 between Salt Lake City and Provo and from U. ~
Highway 189 between Provo and Heber City or fror
U. S. Highway 52 from Orem to the junction of U. ~
1
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Higll\rn~' 18~) and from Heber to the Utah-Colorado state

line OV('l' U. S. H iglnvay 40. It generally holds the aut)J.mty in sen'\' chart0r round trips originating on all
roufos s<~rve<l in its n•gular common carrier operation,
1'f~strictPd only· against transportation service for tours
on any n•gnlar schedule or regular route and trips wholly
witJ1in nnmicipal corporate limits served by urban transportation cornpanit~s (R. 622-623).
A numhPr of witnesses appeared on behalf of Salt
Lake 'l1ransportation, which fall into three general classifications. Those vvl10 are affilated officially with a
public or (~cnnmunity body; those with private business
interests; and officials of Salt Lake Transportation.
Within the first group were: H. Devereaux Jennings
-- Assistant Director of the State Tourist and Publicity
(R. 31); Lowe Ashton - President, Wasatch Chamber
of Commerce (R. 70); Rnlon Doman - Scout Executive
Emiritns, Boy Scouts of America (R. 88); Andrew R.
--Hurley - City Attorney for Park City (R. 120);
Mnrray .l'\I. Moler - Chairman, Utah Travel Council
(R. 162); F. C. Koziol - Director of the Utah Park
and Recreation Commission (R. 173); Henry Cameron
- President, Granger-Hunter Chamber of Commerce
(R. 187-188); Frank C. Burns - President, Kearns Lions
Cl11b (R. ] 92); Ted Covington - Member of Board of
T>ircctcns, Kearns Chamber of Commerce (R. 290); Ira
B,•pslP.V - .Member of Board of Directors, Davis County
Chamber of Commerce (R. 297); Reid D. Pace - Sumlllit County Cfork, Hoytsville, Utah (R. 308).

5

These witnesses generally testified they would fair,
the additional tour and charter service offered by ~a;
Lake Transportation, but the ·witnesses, without excel
tion, testified they were not aware of deficiencies i
existing transportation service and that they had nr,
been refused charter transportation service. J ennin(
(R. 55); Ashton (R. 86-87); Doman (R. 102); Hm/
(R. 151, 153); Moler (R. Hi9); Koziol (R. 185, !Si
Cameron (R. 189); Burns (R. 198-199); Covington q:
296); Beesley (R. 306); Pace (R. 315, 316, 317).
1

The second group were persons who own and opera1
businesses in the ski resort areas. They testified fo
Salt Lake Transportation to be able to transport peo1Jl1
principally skiers, behveen Alta, Brighton, Park Cii
and Wasatch State Park. These witnesses also said thr
were not aware of deficiencies in existing carriers' cha:
ter service. None of them had ever called Continen!i
or been refused Continental's services. Gertrude Howa1
- Owner-operator Mount Majestic Manor at Brigltti
(R. 241); Lee Bronson - Owner-manager Rustler Lo<l1
at Alta (R. 324, 328).
1

Mr. Charles A. Boynton, ,Jr., President and Gem:
Manager of the Salt Lake Transportation, testified·
to the Company's equipment and that Salt Lake Tran
portation presently held certain charter authority. E
hibit 5 (R. 528) contains this authority and limits l~
point of origin of Salt Lake Transportation in this r
spect to Salt Lake City (R. 250) although Salt La
Transportation has considered the Salt Lake City orif
point to encompass the greater Salt Lake area (R. 28'
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Salt Lake Transportation did not present an income
tJinternent (R. 274) and its President said his Company
wankd to compete with Continental's charter service
rights (R. 27G).
Salt Lake 'I1ransportation cmrently operates an airport limousine sPrvice, a rent-a-car service, and Gray
Line Sight-sE>eing tours and the same equipment used for
these operations would be utilized in its proposed charter
service (R. 287).
Concerning equipment, its witnesses testified that
for prPsently authorized operations it has been necessary
for the company to secure equipment from other carriers
and at the present time the company has found it more
1~conomieal to borrow additional buses from other carriers than to maintain its own (R. 332). During the
skiing sPason the company operates sometimes 25 to 30
n:hieles on Saturday mornings in January and it obtains
as many as 15 or 20 buses from Lewis Bros. Lines (R.
;)~3). Th(' last equipment purchased outright for charter
:service b.v Salt Lake Transportation preceded the hearrng by some fifteen months (R. 334).
Continental's evidence was introduced through Exhihits 40 through 54 (R. 584-599c) and shows the Company's income statements, operating ratios, and bus miles
operated, revenues derived in Utah, and equipment and
linses licensed in Utah. Exhibit 51 (R. 596) shows Conti1Hnt'1 l's Utah investment to be $3,794,230.07 as of Der-0rnhc·r 31, 19G5 (R. 596) with a $525,480.43 payroll in
l't:d1 for tlie year 1965 (R. 597).

7

Testimony and evidence showed Continental had nr, 1
turned down anyone desiring charter service and ha,
equipment available for this service at all times (R. 504
Continental maintaim; and bases approximately 2:
buses in Utah (R. 510) and derived $8,327 in revenues fo
its charter service in Utah in 1965 (R. 513, 599).
1

Tour and charter service revenues are set forth ii
the Special Bus Revenue classification of the Company'
Exhibits ( R. 584-599). The classification also contain.
revenues derived from the interstate aspects of Conti
nental's operations ( R. 514).
The Record was closed June 21, 1966 and on Januar
20, 1967 the Commission issued its Report and OrdP1
substantially granting the authority sought by Salt Lak
Transportation (R. 618-626) and as amended in its Ordr:
issued April 6, 1967 (R. 645-647).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COMMISSION FAILED TO MAKE ESSENTIAL
FINDINGS.

We recognize as we begin this argument that ti1
provisions of Utah Code Ann. 1953, Sec. 54-7-16 reqwr
" ... The findings and conclusions of the commission r
questions of fact shall be final and shall not be subjci
to review. Such questions of fact shall include ultirna'
facts and the findings and conclusions of the comrnis~iv
on reasonableness and discrimination."
1

8

It is 111andator,\·, however, that the Commission make
findings on thP essPntial elPnwnts of the case, and if such
f'iwling:-> an· not mad<', obviously a Commission Order is
mm·asonahlc, arbitrary, capricious and unlawful and
iiirn4 bt~ S(~t aside.

facts to lw established in a certificate proceed[ug rn tlw 8tate of Utah are> well defined and have been
, rogn1ied for a substantial period of time.
'rlll'

fu M 11.lcahy v. Public Service Commission, 101 Utah
:.:±5, 117 P .2d 298 ( Ul41), this Court stated as follows:

"While evidence pertinent to any question
involvrd in the application may be presented on
the hearing, the commission's determinations
would proce!'.d as follows:
"Does the imblic convenience and necessity require further, new or additional common carrier
s0 rvice in the territory proposed to be served~
l f not, the application should be denied. If such
se>rvice is required, should the applicant be permitted to re>nder it~ In determining the answer
tu this question the commission shall consider the
following matters: (1) Is the applicant finaneially able to perform the service~ If not, his
application must be denied. (2) ·will the operations proposed unduly injure the highway over
which the operations must be carried on, or unduly interfere with th0 use of the same by the
traveling public? If either phase of this question
be answ0red in the affirmative the application
should be denied. (3) Although beneficial to the
tnTitory to be served, would the service proposed
be detrimental to the people of the states as a
whole•~ If so, the application should be denied.
(-1) Having found now that the convenience and

9

necessity of the r~ublic ii: _thP territory propost·rl
to be served, require additional St>rvice; that sneh
service will not be detrimental to the people of
the state as a whole; that applicant is financially
able to render the service; that the service will
not unduly injure the highway or unduly interferi
with the public traveling thereon, the question is:
Should such new service be rendered by existino
carriers or by the new applicant? This questio~
poses for the commission, not the finding of a
factual answer, but the determinafaon of a matt"r
of policy. Which in the opinion of the commission
will best subserve the public convenience, neee 1
sity and welfare? And in determining thi8 matter
the commission under the statute may and shou](]
take into consideration the existing transportation
facilities, their investment, the taxes they pay,
the services they have rendered and are now rend.
ering; the need of a continuation of such service~:
the effect upon such services of a new obligatio11
to serve; the effect upon such services of a new
competitor in the transportation field; the effect
of a new competitor or carrier upon the economic
industrial, social and intellectual life of the terri
tory, and other matters which may affect tl1r
public welfare, and the growth and developmen'
of the life in, and resources of the state. Tha·
existing carriers engaged in transportation to aw
from a certain field or territory, rendering tl11
service it is permitted or ordered to do, reasov
ably, adequately and efficiently, is not lightly o
ruthlessly to be interfered with, or subjected 1
needless competition, is evident from the proY1
sions of the statute Section 5 of Chapter 65, ljai1,·
of Utah 1935, after vesting in the commission tl
power to regulate and supervise all comnw,
motor carriers reads: '* * * to n•gulate the faci:
ities, accounts, service and safety of operatioi
of each such common motor carrier, to regula'
1

1
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operating and time schedules so as to meet the
needs of any community, and so as to insure adequate transportation service to the territory traversed by such common motor carriers, and so as
to prevent unnecessary duplication of service between these common motor carriers, and between
them and the lines of competing steam and electric
railroads; and the commisison may require the
coordination of the service and schedules of competing common carriers by motor vehicles or electric and steam railroads * * * .'
"An applicant desiring to enter a new territory, or to enlarge the nature or type of the service
he is permitted to render must therefore show that
from the standpoint of public convenience and
necessity there is a need for such service; that
tho existing service is not adequate and convenient, and that his operation would eliminate such
inadequacy and inconvenience. He must also show
that the public welfare would be better subserved
if lw rendered the service than if the existing
carrier were permitted to do so. The paramount
consideration is the benefit to the public, the
promotion and advancement of its growth and
welfare. Yet the interests of the existing certificate holder should be protected so far as that
can be done without injury to the public, either
to its present welfare or hindering its future
growth, development, and advancement. Corporation Comm. Y. Pacific Grevhound Lines, 54 Ariz.
159, 94 P.2d 443; Chicago R.R. Co. v. Commerce
Comm., 336 Ill. 51, 167 N.E. 840. Having given
dm-' consideration to those matters the commission
determines whether the existing carriers or a new
one should be permitted to render the proposed
service. lf the commission's determination finds
j nstification in the evidence, it is not a law ques-

11

~ion. and we cannot review or modify it or ~,,
it aside. Regardless of what our own views on !Ji,
matters may be, the determination of the COlil
mission on this matter finds support or justifica
tion in the evidencl>. \Ve cannot say it acted ari
trarily or capriciously, and the finding thertr1
must stand."
11

1

Findings as to essential elements in this case, ho 11
ever, are nonexistent.
In Finding No. 1 (R. 619), the Commission sets forti
the fact that Salt Lake Transportation presently holu
certain certificates and the scope of its present authorit;
In Finding No. 2 ( R. 619), the C01mnission mer11h
states the authority Salt Lake rrransportation reqnes(P1:
through its Application.
In Finding No. 3, the Commission Orders stat11~
"It (Salt Lake Transportation) has more than adequat,
equipment and facilities to conduct the proposed opera
tion and is financially capable of doing so."
This is an ultimate finding, if anything, and cori
trary to the Record before the Commission which dii
closes that Salt Lake Transportation had no intentio
of placing into evidence even its financial statement (TI
274). And with respect to equipment, the Record is aga1
undisputed that Salt Lake Transportation presently rnu
lease equipment from other carriers and that it intend1
to borrow or lease equipment if it were authorized
proceed under this Application (R. 331-334).
1

•
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Obvjom.;ly the Commission, based upon this testiHiony, could not make an adequate finding that it has
"more" than adequate equipment and facilities to conduct
the proposed operation. It cannot tell us, for example,
Y1lwtlwr the cost of equipment will make the service
infeasible because there is no finding as to cost. It
cannot tell ns whether equipmet for the service can be
01 is to he leased and its cost. For present operations
Salt Lake Tram;portation must borrow equipment and so
on what factual basis can this company have "more" than
adequate equiprnenO The Commission does not tell us.
It has not made the necessary finding.
Finding No. 4 merely reviews the sight-seeing and
to1lf operations as conducted by Salt Lake Transportation in the past and adds nothing to essential findings
reqnired (R. 620).
Finding No. 5 purports to find that "There has been
a substantial population and economic growth in the
origin counties of the Application" (R. 620). And that
"There appPars a need for transportation service which
can originate at a point other than Salt Lake City in the
origin counties of the Application and to serve to and
from various points in Utah.
This purported finding m like manner refers to
allPged needs which are undefined. This is an ultimate
finding or a conclusion not a finding as must be made
11.1 a fact finding body so that a reviewing body can
detPrmine whether authority has been exceeded. But
there an• no facts upon which such a finding could be

13

based. The Record dis(·loses that Continental, as WPI:
as other common carriers, can and arP p<.·rforming charter service at the presc•nt tinw and ver.v ext<>nsivel\
through the areas in question.
Continental's authorit:,, as has been pointt•d oni,
extends from U. S. Higlnvay d<>signations in thP :w mili
area in which Salt Lake rl'ransportation se<.·ks its anthr1r
ity (R. 507).
Other carriers' evidence was also impn•ssive in thi,
respect. This testimony tracPs routes in great detail
through certain areas and shows the extensive geograph)
covered by these carriers. Mr. Joseph M. Lewis for
plaintiff, Lewis Bros. Stages, testified as to certain of
the Lewis Bros.' routes over which that Company and
its affiliates are allowed to t•xtend round trip charte
service (R. 443-444), from which the Conunission is bonn1i
to find, along with the other evidence in the Record that
present carriers' charter and tour ability substantiall1
blanket the area now sought to be certified to Salt Lakr'
rrransportation. But the element with respect to the lar'r
of need will be developed later. It is suffice to say he1
there are no facts set forth in the findings from whid1
the Commission's conclusion of "need," as set forth ir:
Finding No. 5 (R. G21) can be predicated.
1

1

Findings G through 14 describe the ntrious pro\eii
ants before the Commission and their operating authnr
ities and Finding No. 15 in conclusion form states:
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"Because of the limitations of the authority
of existing carriers it is apparent that they cannot
11wet the requirements for service ontlined by the
supporting witn('sst•s and proposed by the applicant, for which the Commission finds a public
need.
* * * * * *
rt apperars to the Commission that the grant
of authority as applied for in the Application
would not unduly affect existing carriers adHnwly and will not burden the highways, and
will serve the best public interest and be responsin~ to a pnblic need." (R. 624)
Tliese conld only be argued to be ultimate findings
at hef't and, in fact, represent conclusions, not findings at
all.
1'lw foregoing is all we have from the Commission
on its 1nirportcd findings of public convenience and necestiitv. rl'lw Commission has fallen far short of its statutory
duty and has failed and refnsed to make findings. In
no \Vay can we locate findings as to the essential elements
of this case as dictated by authorities outlined above.

The Commission is an administrative agency created
by Statutes of the State of Utah, Utah Code Ann. 1953,
Sec. 54-1-1 - 54-7-30 and although it engages in quasi,indicial functions, it is basically a fact finding body.
It is an elementary rule of law that administrative
agencies mnst make fnll and complete findings of fact
1111un which to rest their decisions. As the cases which
we will cite disclose, adequate findings of fact are an
:ibsol ute neecssity. The basic reason for this requirement
! ' lo L'uahl(• r1•vit•wing courts to determine readily whether

15

the administrative body has properly pursued its authority, confined its inquiry to its statutory limitations, and
correctly applied thP law to tht~ facts. Another wry
practical reason is to aid the party litiganhl in framin,;
I''
and the Court in deciding, the issues on appeal.
1
decision of the Commission completely violates this p1 11
mentary principle of administrative law.

n-

In Volume 2, Davis, Administrative Law Treatis<>, at
page 444, Section 16.05, the following is stated with
respect to the requirement that administrative agene.if·~
must make full and complete fin dings of fact upon di~
puted issues:
"The practical reasons for reqmrmg administrative findings are so powerful that the
requirement has been imposed with remarkablP
uniformity by virtually all federal and state
courts, irrespective of a statutory requirernl'nt.
The reasons have to do with facilitating jndil'ia\
review, avoiding judicial usurpation of administrative functions, assuring more careful administrative consideration, helping parties plan thei1
cases for rehearings and judicial review, and keeping agencies within their jurisdiction.
"Much the most prominent reason discusser!
in judicial opinions, and the reason which is
clearly dominant in judicial motivation, is the
facilitation of judicial review. A simple illustration will readily show the need for findings a~
an aid to judicial review. A statute provided that
no milk license should be granted unless the ro11 1
missioner 'is statisfied that the applicant is qual1
fied by character, experience, financial responsi
bility and equipment to properly conduct th~ pro
posed business, that the issuance of the 11ccm1
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will not tend to a destructive competition in a
market already adequately served, and that issuance of the license~ is in the public interest.' For
tlw court to review a bnlky record without knowi11g which of the 10ix factors the commissioner
fomid to be lacking would obviou10ly be wasteful.
Hardly wrprising \Va8 the court's holding that
·Only after the commissioner has made findings of
fact can the court decide whether the findings are
sut;taincd by the evidence .... ' When issues are
uwn· complex and interdc~pendent, the need for
findings is even greater.
"The language of Mr. Justice Cardozo, in a
cm;e in which the Court could do no more than get
an impression that the Commission may have
acted properly, is often quoted: 'The difficulty
is that it has not said so with the simplicity and
clearness through which a halting impression
ripens into reasonable certitude. In the end we
art~ left to spell out, to argue, to choose between
conflieting inf erenccs. Something more precise is
requisite in the quasi-jnrisdictional findings of an
administrative agency. . . . vVe must know what a
decision means before the duty becomes ours to
say whether it is right or wrong.' Mr. Justice
Frankfurther has explained that the requirement
'is merely part of the need for courts to know
what it is that the Commission has really determined in order that they may know what to review.... This is the real ground for the decisions
which have found Interstate Commerce Commission orders wanting in necessary findings.' If
there were no law requiring findings, judges struggling with masses of evidence and hazy findings,
trying their best to discover whether the agency
has applied the proper principles, would surely
invent such a requirement. Characteristic judicial
remarks seem to manifest considerable patience:
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'We only require that, whatevPr result be reacbrrl
enou?h. be put of r~·cord to enable us to perfo 1111
the limited task wl11ch is ours.' "
The Supreme Court of the United States in the ca,1,
of Colorado-Wy01ning Gas Company v. Federal I'o1li:
Commission, et al., 324 U.S. G2G, 89 L. ed 1235, was cou.
fronted with a similar situation. In that case an ess~, 1
tial finding of fact upon which tlw Federal Povver Corn
mission decision was based n'lated to the quantity ul
natural gas actually sold by the public utility at a certain
time, and the effect the 8ale had upon an allocation of
costs. The Staff of the Federal Power Commission had
used one method of making the determination and the
Commission another. The findings, however, were nol
sufficient to disclose to the reviewing court which method
was the basis of decision, or why it was preferred. In
other words, the reviewing court was presented with tl1~
dilemma of determining whether there was substantia:
evidence to support FPC's ultimate finding, but was not
provided with anything which showed the various factor~
and figures taken into consideration which were adopte1l
by the Commission in arriving at its ultimate conclusion
In respect thereto, the court stated the following, corn
mencing at page 633, U.S.:
"We do not know why the lower figure wn:
rejected. There are no findings to guide us. li
the record there is testimony which may suffice1'·
a partial reconcilating of the difference and wh1d
casts some doubts on the accuracy of the low~ 1
figure. But we have been unable completely Ii
reconcile the difference.
1
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''rrlie reviL·w which Congress has provided
for these ratP orders is limited. Section 19(b) 15
USCA ~ 717 r (b), 4 FCA title 15, ~ 717 r (b) says
that the 'finding of the Corrunission as to the facts,
if ::;upported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.' But ·we must first know what the 'findrng' i::; hdore we can give it that conclusive weight.
\Ve have repeatedly emphasized the need for clar1ty aml compld<·ness in the basic or essential findings on which administrative orders rest, Florida
v. United States, 28~ U.S. 194, 215, 75 L. ed 291,
:J04, flt S. Ct. 119; United States v. Baltimore &
0. R. Co., 293 U. S. 454, 464, 79 L. ed 587, 594,
55 S. Ct. 268; United States v. Chicago, M. St.
P. & P. R. Co., 294 U. S. 499, 504, 505, 510, 511,
79 L. Pd 1023, 1028, 1029, 1031, 1032, 55 s. Ct. 462;
TTnikd States v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp.,
;H5 U. 8. 475, 488, 489, 86 L. ed 971, 982, 62 S. Ct.
72:2. ThPir absence can only clog the administrat1vL'. function and add to the delays in rate making.
vV \-' cannot dispense \Vi th them for Congress has
provided thr standards for judicial review under
this Act.~ 19(b). The courts cannot perform the
function which Congress assigned to them in absence of adequate findings. Nor are they authorizPd under ~ 19 (b) to make findings and substitute
them for those of the Commission."
A similar statement is contained in United States v.
Chicar10, illilwaukcc, St. Panl & Pacific Railroad Co.,
294 U. ~. 499, 79 L. ed 1023, at page 510, U. S., where
the following appears:
"We would not be understood as saying that
1lwn do not lurk in this report phrases or sentcnees suggestive of a different meaning. O~e
gains at places the impression that the Commission looked upon the proposed reduction as some1
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thing more. than 3: disruptive tend<>ncy; that it
found unfairness 111 the old relation of parit·
between B_raz~l an~ Springfield; and that tlw Di'\:
schedule_ 111 its _Judgment would confirm Mil
waukee m t~e enJOJ'1ll~n~ of an undue proporti 1111
of. the traffic. The difficulty is that it has nut
sai~ so with_ the_ simplic~ty and clearness throug]
which a halt111g impress10n ripens into reasonahJ 1
certitude. In the end we are left to spell out, tu
argue, to choose between conflicting infrnincl'i.
Somthing more precise is requisite in thr qua,i
jurisdictional findings of an administrativ(· a<•
ency. Beaumont, S.L. & \V.R. Co. v. United Statr,,
282 U.S. 74, 86, 75 L. ed. 221, 229, 51 S. Ct. J:
Florida v. United States, 282 U.S. 194, 215 75 L
ed. 291, 304, 51 S. Ct. 119. Vv e must know what n
decision means before the duty becomes ours !11
say whether it is right or wrong."
1

~

That case involved railroad rates. The I.C.C. adjusted
various rates but did not set forth sufficient findings \1 1
indicate why it had done so, what the impact would hav1
been if the current situation had been allowed to remain,
etc. Only general conclusions were stated by the Corn
mission to justify its action, so the court held that gen·
eralizations to the effect that a change in rates wai
necessary was not sufficient without further findings.
In Sagniaw Broadcasting C01npany v. Federal Co111
munications Conimission, 96 F. 2d 554, the Court u.
Appeals for the District of Columbia handed down an
exhaustive review of the reasons for requiring full an'
complete findings, and a concise outline of just wlw
those findings should contain and upon what subjectthey should be made. That case involved conflictlll'
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a1J]Jlications for a certificate to construct a radio station,
w w11i('h pnblic convenience and necessity had been found
1n favor of one applicant and against the other applicant.
'l'h(· !'onrt stated at page 559 the following:
wrhe requirement that courts, and commiss10ns acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, shall
make findings of fact, is a means provided by
Congress for guaranteeing that cases shall be decided aceording to the evidence and the law, rather
tlian arbitrarily or from extralegal considerations;
and findings of fact serve the additional purpose,
where provisions for review are made, of apprising the parties and the reviewing tribunal of the
factual basis of the action of the court or commission, so that the parties and the reviewing
tribunal may determine whether the case has been
(foeided upon the evidence and the law or, on
the contrary, upon arbitrary or extralegal considerations. When a decision is accompanied by
findings of fact, the reviewing court can decide
whether the decision reached by the court or commisiou follows as a matter of law from the facts
stated as its basis, and also whether the facts so
stated have any substantial support in the evidence. In the absence of findings of fact the reviewing tribunal can determine neither of these
things. The requirement of findings is thus far
from a technicality. On the contrary, it is to insure
against Star Chamber methods, to make certain
that justice shall be administered according to
facts and law. This is fully as important in respect of commissions as it is in respect of courts.
"In discussing the necessary content of findings of fact, it will be helpful to spell out the
proef'ss which a commission properly follows in
n•aching a decision. The process necessarily inclndes at. least four parts: (1) evidence must be

21

take~ _a_nd Wf•ighed, both as to its accman
111
cred1b1hty; (2) from att(•ntivP considerati' ·
this evidence a determination of facts of a ~~ '
or underl_ying natun• rnnst lw reached; (3) /;'.;:
these basic facts tlw u lti ma tP fact::-;, 11suall» in i:.
language of the statut<>, ar<> to lw inf(Tred, or ni
as the case may lw; ( 4) from this findinir t',
decision will follow by thP application of thr· ~fa/'
tory criterion. For exarnple, bdorp tlw Conunm
ca_ti~ns Commission may grant a construction 111
nut it must, undPr thP ::-;tatuh·, lw convin('ed t:,
the public interest, COJff<•nit>nc<>, or nec<;ssitY 1 .
be served. An affirmative or negative fo1di.11;.;,
this topic would be a finding of ultimate fact~''
1

Commencing again at page 5G1 appPars the followi 11 ,
"These decisions show that a reviewing COlll
cannot properly exerci::-;e its function upon flli,J.
ings of ultimate fact alonP, but must require al."
findings of the basic facts "\vhich represent ti.
determination of the administrative body as ·
the meaning of the evidence, and from whid1 tJ
ultimate facts flow. Such findings are, we thiJ1~
just as necessary in cases involving the applicc
tion of tlw statutory criterion of public comer
ience, interest, or necessity set up by the Corn
munications Act, as in thosP cases which nndt>r tl1
Interstate Commerc(~ Act rPquire the applicatior
of the standard of unjust discrimination, or i1
those cases which under state public utility sta
utes require the application of the criter:on 1
public conveniencP and necessity." (Emphas1ssur
plied)
1

1

And again at page 562 :
"As to financial qualifications, the appellwi
urges as error the Commission's finding_tl.1at '1 1111 '
applicants are possessed of the reqms1te ·
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fmancial qualifications.' The question of financial
qualification has at least two aspects: first, has
the applicant enough resources to construct the
slation and to operate it for a brief period of
time; and second, is there a reasonable likeW10od
of financial profit to be expected from the operaL10n of the station, or are the applicant's personal
resources such that he is able and willing to
operate a station for a considerable period of time
at a Joss. 'J1he Commission's finding that the
intervenors are financially qualified is an inference rather than a finding of fact, and does not
disclose any facts bearing on either of the above
a::;pec~ts of the question of financial qualifications.
Heitmeyer v. Federal Communications Commission, supra. 'l1he Commission did make findings
as to the present resources of the intervenors,
which we think are adequately suppported by the
record. 'I'he appellant urges, however, that the
Commission erred in failing to find that a station operated as proposed by the intervenors
would not receive ::mfficient commercial support
lo justify its operation. As to the likelihood of
such commercial support the Commission said
only that 'It is anticipated that the monthly income expected to be derived from the station's
operation would approximate $5,500.' This statement can hardly be characterized as a finding as
to the commercial support which the intervenors'
station might farily expect. It is not even coupled
with a statement as to the monthly expenses of
the proposed station from which by inference the
conclusion could be drawn that the station would
have a reasonable likelihood of operating at a
profit. Even though there may be evidence in
tfo. · record - upon this we do not pass - from
which the Commission might have concluded that
th.; i 11tervenors would receive adequate commer-
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cial support in the sem;e
. . above stated, this <l Of.,,
Comm1ss1on from its duty of mak.
mg a fmdmg as the result of its considerati
of that evidence. The language of .Mr. J usti~,'.'.
Butler in Atchison, '1.1. & S. :B~. Ry. Co. v. Unitt>i:
States, 295 U.S. 193, 55 S. Ct. 748, 79 L. ed. 138'1
that:
.,
~10 t exc~se. tl ie

" 'This court ·will not search the record to
ascertain whether, by use of what thL're may lw
found, general and ambiguous statements i 1; fo,
report intended to serve as findings may uy con
struction be given a meaning sufficiently definit,
and certain to constitute a valid basis for !ht
order. In the absence of a finding of essential
basic facts, the order cannot be sustained.' 39:1
U. S. 193, at pages 201, 202, 55 S. Ct. 748 at pag:"
752, 79 L. ed. 1382.
seems pertinent. It is not the duty of the court
to make findings for the Commission and when
the Commission has failed in its duty to make sncli
findings, it is impossible for the court to revie1:
its conclusion. This too we regard as reversibJ,
error."
The above case hold8 that a finding of public convt'll·
ience and necessity is an ultimate finding only, whiril
must be supported by primary findings of the facts whicl1
constitute public com·enience and n0cessity. In addition,
such findings as that '' ... there appears a need for 1
transportation service ·which can originate at a porn:
other than Salt Lah' Cit~· ... " is not sufficient wlw
Salt Lake City is 110t a "point"; whPn its many street'
and highways are not rpfrrred to in the context of hi
hearing and when the existing S(Jnicc points of other r111
11
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are not refrrred to at all. In such event, individual
l indings nnrnt bP made upon precise locations and express
jg;eds and exprPss deficiencies of existing carrier services.
rir·rs

Jn eontrast to thf~ requirements set forth by the
Conrt of AP}wals in the Saginaw case, such purported
finding in tlte Commi::;;sion decision at (R. 621) is at best
an ultimate finding. How much transportation is reqmrPd, hy whom is it required, from where to where is
it required. \Ve are dealing here with a 26 mile area
\\J1ic11 intlndes the mo::;;t heavily concentrated population
and streets and highways in the State of Utah and yet
tl1e Commission is unable to specify any locations, any
points, anything whatever upon which a finding as to
need could be based.

The case of Johnston Broadcasting Co. v. Federal
Communications Cornnii0sion, 175 F. 2d 351, involved
competitive permit::;;, one requesting authority to construct a new station and the other requesting authority to
change frequency in an existing station. This case
also contained an excellent discussion of the various
findings of fact which must be made by an administrative
body in aniving at its ultimate decision. Commencing
at page 356, the court stated:
"The principles which govern the interplay of
administrative and judicial functions in a comparative consideration are basically the same as
lhosf' which govern in the determination of the
qnali fication of a single applicant. The Comruission has wide powers and discretion, but upon
25

appeal the courts must determine whether its ..
tion was w~thi:r_i its :st.at~1to1y authority and ap1'.:,
cable constitutional lnmtattom;, and the findinu.
conclusions and decision must Le such that tl.
courts can exercise that jurisdictiou. But (1 1
essentials to kgally valid conclm;ions differ, a.·
the two problems, one of bare qualification ai 1,,
the other of corn1mrative qualifications, differ. J·
respect to com para ti ve d(•ei s ions, th('se arp t!.
essentials: ( 1) The ba:sc>s or reasons for ti
final conclusion must be clearly stated. (2) Tl w
conclusion must be a rational result from tb
findings of ultimate fact:-;, and those findings llllb
be sufficient in number and substance to snppo:
the conclusion. ( 3) The ultimate facts as foun1:
must appear as rational inferences from the finri.
ings of the basic facts. ( 4) The findings of th1
basic facts must be sup]Jorted by suLstantial Pri
deuce. ( 5) Findings mu:st be made in respect(,,
every difference, except those whid1 are frirolou:
or wholly unsubstantial, between the apvlica11l:
indicated by the evidence and advanced by OJ11
of the parties as effective. (G) r_rhe final conclrr
sion mm;t be upon a composite consideration o,
the findings as to the several differences, pro anc
con each applicant.
1

"The first four of these essentials are esta~
lished requisites of Commission decisions. TJH
progress to a valid conclusion, as long-since cstan
lished by tlw cases, is: to receive the evidenc1:
then to make from the e\'idence findings of baft·
facts; then to mak<,, hy inference from the has 11
facts, findings of tlw nltirnate facts whir!t ai«
requisite to dPcision; then to draw a final conel
sion by tlw applic-ation of the statutory critt>ll 11 '
to the ultima,tp facts. rJ1)H• last two <•ssentiab a)iui
stated - ( 5) and ( G) - a re made necessary !J~· 1:,.
11
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peculiar characteristics of a comparative determination. The Commission cannot ingore a material difference between two applicants and make
findings in respect to selected characteristics only.
Nt'ith~~r can it base its conclusion upon a selection
from among its findings of differences and ignore
all other findings. It must take into account all
the eharaeforistics which indicate differences, and
reach an over-all relative determination upon an
evalnation of all factors, conflicting in many
cases. • * .,,
It is to be observed from the Johnston case that a
t:·onuuission cannot ignore material differences in dis1mt0d questions of fact as it did in the instant case, nor
can it bas0 its ultimate conclusion on such selected findings of fact as it may elect to make. Findings must be
rnade on every disputed question of fact which is pertinent to the ultimate finding of public convenience and
11ecessity and here the present service offered by existing certificated carriers was completely ignored and the
evidence disregarded.

While the above decisions relating to administrative
apmcies go into considerable detail as to the nature
and extent of findings ·which must be made, this Court
ni. its considerations of administrative matters has basically arrived at the same conclusions.
In Aetna Life Ins. Co. et al. v. Industrial Commis,t·rn, 64 Ftah 415, 231 P. 442 (1924) the court annulled
an award by the Industrial Commission stating that there
was not substantial evidence for the findings that the
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accident occurred while plaintiff's insurance was in effpl. 1
In doing so, the court said at page 444 of the Paeifii·
Reporter:

"A finding of a material fact cannot sustaiJ1
an award, unless the finding is ::supported by snJ
stantial evidence. The evidence need not be dir11r1
or positive; it may be by circumstances or oth~r
facts from which the fact found may be infemd.
But in the latter case the inference must be 8
legitimate one. There must be a reasonable theon
which leads to the conclusion reached. A findin0
cannot be predicated upon mere surmise or crn'
jecture. . . .
1

"This court is reluctant to set aside a finding
of fact made by the Industrial Commission. I1
will not do so if the finding is fairly supported by
legal evidence. There are supposable cases involving the question here presented where thP
evidence would reasonably support a finding
eithPr way on the question of proximate causr
and the finding be sustained, but this is not sucl1
a case.
"For the reason that the findings and conclusions of the Industrial Commission complainea
of are not supported by substantial evidence. The
award as against the plaintiff is annulled."
In considering whether the Commission had failea
to make findings of fact on material matters this Cour1
considered in some depth the findings made by the Corn·
mission in Utah Light and Traction Co. v. Public Servi£
Commission, 101 Utah 99, 118 P.2d 683 (1941).
1

The Commission elaborates at Page 686 of Paeifii
Reporter concerning the findings made in that case.
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'"The Commission expressly found that the
Traction Company 'operates a bus service south1varrl on State Street serving Murray, Midvale,
and Bandy, on a schedule of 22% minutes during
peak periods, and 45 minutes at other times' and
that the 'Salt Lake and Utah R. R. Corporation
operates in the territory adjacent to Redwood
Road (through the west side of Salt Lake Valley)
with five trains north into Salt Lake City and five
trains south each day.' Of course the Commission
ne<'d not descend to such details as to find the
number of people riding each bus or train daily.
'rhe Commission did find that the new service
would stimulate the use of public carriers rather
than private cars and that such service as the
Airways would give would meet the demands of
the public more adequately. It found that the
territory ahove set forth as without bus service is
in 1wed of bus service both intercommunity, and
into Salt Lake City, such as Airways offers it.
It found that this new service was in the public
welfare; that it would tend to develop new homes
and new enterprises in the territory beyond Salt
Lake City limits, and that general development
of that area would be promoted and stimulated by
the new service. Such are proper matters for the
Commission to consider. Mulcahy v. Public Service Commission, Utah, 117 P.2d 298 (not yet reported [in State Reports]). It found that the part
of the territory to be served by the Airways is new
territory being pioneered; and that the roads are
not overburdened with traffic, and the new service will not interfere with the use of the roads by
the general public. It found that new service is
needed, at least to the extent set forth in the
ap11lication, and therefore to that extent the serviee rnnv rendered is inadequate. It found that the
Airways permit will not substantially detract
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from, nor impair existing common carri1:~r servir·i"
that it will not be detrimental to the proplf' 1,.
the State of Utah or the localities to be served
These findings are not set forth in the detail a1111
particularity nsed by courts of law whosp jndu
ments determine ultimate rights of lifo and prn~
erty title, nor need they be so definite nor orderh
These determinations of the Commission inroh·
questions of licernst', or privilege between the sn 1
erign people and the individual who seeks to 011
tain or enjoy such rights or privilege in th(' corn
mon good. The welfare of the public is the riara.
mount issue. These rights are given and regulali-11
to protect the people generally and to insure au
opportunity for all individuals, and each con1
munity, to grow and develop and assure its in
habitants the most complete and abundant Jif
possible, commensurate with equal privileges for
all others."
ThPn, if' vast difference between this case and the om
at bar cone~·rning the matters on which findings wer:
made and on which the Court apparently satisfied itsfl:
there was substantial evidence. Here there is no findin~
concernng the equipment which will be dedicated to tJ1,
intended service and all equipment referred to is clearly
shown by the record to have been dedicated to otliet
service.
Here there is no finding that Salt Lake Transpor
tation Service "would meet the demands of the pnbli:
more adequately" than existing service.
Here there is no finding that the areas sought tn 1,
certificated are "without bus service," or "in need n
bus service."
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Hne there is no finding as to any tendency on the
p;u t or the proposed service to "development of new
] 1ouws and nPw enterpris<:>s," or contribute in any way
to the economy.

'J1he Coturnission has failed to make the findings
cssPntial lo sustain its granting of a certificate of con1enicnc1· and necessity and its order must be set aside.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS THAT THERE IS A PUBLIC
NEED FOR ADDITIONAL TOUR AND CHARTER
SERVICE AND THAT OTHER CARRIERS PRESENTLY CERTIFICATED CANNOT PERFORM THE
SERVICE IF REQUIRED AND THAT PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY REQUIRES THE
GRANTING OF A CERTIFICATE OF CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY TO AN ADDITIONAL
CARRIER.

Salt Lake ':Cransportation failed to present any evidence r0nc1•rning a need of the general public for tour
or chart<'l' senice originating and returning to and from
points along Contincntal's certificated origin and return
points. 'rhesf: points are on U.S. Highway 91 in Salt
Lah City and sonth and between Provo and Deer Creek
Darn::;itc; along U. S. Highway 40 west in Salt Lake and
\Hst to the Utah-Nevada line and from the Utah-Wyoming state line on the north to the Utah-Arizona state
line on thP sonth on U. S. Highway 91. These points are
;ilso along TT. 8. Highway 40 in Salt Lake City and to
the TTtah-Colorado state line and on U. S. Highway 91
l 1etween ~alt Lake City and Provo and from U. S. High'nty 1~~:l lwhn·en Provo and Heber City or from U. S.
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Highway 52 from Orem to tlw junction of L:. ;:-;. tl1gll 110 ,
189 and from Heber to the Utah-Colorado state linr ow.
U. S. Highway 40. ContiHental gPnPrally holdt; 11i
authority to serve charfrr round trips originating 1111
all routes served in ih; n~gular common carrier opera
tion, restricted only against transportation ser\·ice for
tours on any regular schednl<> or regular route and trip,
wholly within municipal corporate limit::; sPrved by nr)J 0,
transportation companies ( R. G22-G23).

1

1

1

The Record is also devoid of any testimony or er·
dence indicating that Continental had failed or refus~u
to perform service requested of it. As a matter of far:r
Salt Lake Transportation witnesses, without exceptiun,
testified either that they were unaware Continental coulil
perform these services, Gertrude Howard (R. 241):
Lee Bronson (R. 324, 328), or that they would have nu
objection if Contirn·ntal or another carrier perforrne:l
the service, Howard (R. 241, 244); Bronson (R. 32±1
UndPr the:'\e eireurnstances it is apparent Salt Lak
Transportation has failed to present evidence upon whicl
the Commission could base a finding as to need for the
required service. The prior certification of a carrier i1
a particular area, as is the case of Continental here.
carries with it considerable weight as a matter of law
and burdens the applicant to a degree of proof whirl~
shows that existing carriers cannot or will not perform
the required service.
1

This court in Utah Light & Traction Co. i:. Pub/Ir
Service Commission, et al., supra, at Page 690 of tl1
Pacific Reporter said:

1
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" ·_ .. That existing carriers engaged in transportation to and from a cPrtain field or territory,
rendering the service it is permitted or ordered
to <lo, r<•asonably, adequately and efficiently, is
not lightly or ruthlessly to be interfered with, or
snbjeded to needless competition, is evident from
the provisions of the statute.
* * * *
" 'An applicant desiring to enter a new territory, or to enlarge the nature or type of the service he is permitted to render must therefore show
that from the standpoint of public convenience
and necessity there is need for such service; that
the existing service is not adequate and convenient, and that his operation would eliminate such
inadequacy and inconvenience. . '"
The co mt also said, at Page 690:
'' ... when a territory is satisfactorily serviced,
and its tram;poration facilities are ample, a duplication of such service which unfairly interferes
with the existing carriers may undermine and
weaken the transportation setup generally and
thus deprive the public of an efficient permanent
service. True, existing carriers benefits from the
n~stricted competition, but this is merely incidental in the solution of the problem of securing
adequate and permanent service.... "
And in Salt Lake Transfer Conipany vs. Public
Service Coinmi:iiiion of Utah, et al., 11 Utah 2d 121,
3:-i,"i P.2d 70G, 710 (1960):
"A search of the record reveals nothing upon
which to base the conclusion that the addition of
Barton's services will in any way add to public
eom'1-'nie11ce and necessity with regard to explo-
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~~ves. As the record now stands, Ashworth anrJ
;:)alt. La~e Transfer are ~endering an adequa 11,
service m the transportation of explosives. Bf'.
fore additional service is authorized by the Culll
mission, the applicant must show that the existiu"
service is not adequate and convenient and tha~
his proposed operation would eliminate the inadP.
quacy and inconvenience."

And in Lake Shore J.ll otor Coach Lines, Inc. ,
Welling, ct al., 9 Utah 2d 114, 339 P.2d 1011, 1014 (19j9i
"The Commission is charged with the responsi
bility of over-all planning so that the pnblic wil:
be furnished with the most frequent, economieat
and convenient service possible, not only premt
ly, but in the long run. This involves considera
tion of all of the pertinent factors bearing U]JOL
the advisability of authorizing additional servicl':
it includes protection of existing carriers who)1
services may become impaired or even destroye1l
by permitting competition, the potential of bu>i·
ness, the ability, financial and otherwise, of th
applicant to render the proposed service, and tL1
burdening of the highways. The Commission must
weigh all of such matters in determining whetlte:
public convenience and necessity require the pru
posed service.... "
1

In Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines, Inc. v. Bennet/
et al., 8 Utah 2d 293, 333 P.2d 1061 (1958), the Cour'.
set aside an order of the Commission granting an ii'
crease to a common carrier on the grounds that theri
was no support in the record for a finding that publ 1
convenience and necessity required the additional ser
ice, and that its effect would be to impair transportati1J'
service by undermining the economic well being of tJ
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''('lTices then in operation. Speaking generally of the
principles underlying regulation of utilities, the court
;:,a1<l, commencing at Page 10G2, of the Pacific Reporter:
"lt is well to have in mind the principles underlying the regulation of common carriers by the
Public 8ervice Commission. Generally speaking,
competition is a good thing because it tends to
i:ontrol exce:sses and abuses, and to produce the
best goods and services at the lowest prices. It
thus :serves as a vital and stimulating force in
om economic an<l industrial life and is sometimes said to be the life of commerce. An exception to this generality exists in services providing
gas, telephone, electricity, transportation and certain others where competition would result in
duplication of expensive facilities which the public
would have to pay for in the long run and thus
be inimical to its interest. In order to eliminate
such waste full duplicaion of facilities and services, businesses of that type are granted monopoly
franchi:ses. As a condition to such privilege, the
utilities are obliged to submit to regulation by
public authority, which takes the place of the
controls usually enforced by competition. . . .
\Vhen a carrier applies to institute a new carrying service, the Commission must take into aceount, not only the immediate advantage to some
members of the public in increased service, and to
the applying carrier in permitting him to enlarge
the scope of his business, but must plan long-range
for the protection and conservation of carrier
st>rvice so that there will be economic stability
aud continuity of service. This obviously cannot
he. done nnles~ existing carriers have a reasonable
degree of protection in the operations they are
rnain 1aining.
i<

*

* *
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"Proving that public convenience and necessiti
would be served by granting additional carrir
authority means something more than showin;,
the mere generality that some members of th'.
public would like and on occasion use such type 01
transportation service. In any populous area it
is easy enough to procure witnesses who will ~a 1
that they would like to see more fre(1uent aii~I
cheaper service. That alone does not prove tha1.
public convenience and necessity so require. Our
understanding of the statute is that there should
be a showing that existing services are in sonw
measure inadequate, or that public need as to
the potential of business is such that then: i~
some reasonable basis in the evidence to beliew
that public convenience and necessity justify th"
additional proposed service."
Speaking of the applicant's witnesses the court continued, at Page 1064:
" . . . It is obvoius, as they without exception
admitted, that their self-interest would be served
by having more carriers with more frequrn1
schedules. In short, the speediest and cheapest
transportation possible, which purpose an additional carrier would tend to serve. In other words,
from their point of view, the more carriers tht
better. This is quite understandable because thei,
were in no way concerned with the long-rangt
planning hereinabove referred to, nor with keep·
ing existing carriers solvent and in operation."

In a concurring opinion Justice Henriod stated,
Page 1065:

a!

"Existing carriers that have expended risk cap
ital and have complied with tariff and othet
Co~mission requirements, ordinarily are entitleil
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to protection against competition until a proposed
competitor or someone else establishes bv substantial evidence a failure to perform the ~ervice
-..vhich the Commission has authorized and ordered
them to perform."
The language in this case squares on all fours with
the Hecord.
Jn th<~ instant proceeding, as the court states, "In
any populous area, it is easy enough to get witnesses
who will say tlH)y would like to see more frequent and
cheaper ;:;ervice." No witness testified on behalf of
Salt Lake Transportation who said any more than that.
H is obviously to the interest of those persons involved
in tomist and publicity work, in chamber of commerce
work, in recreational work, to press for added services
which they can publicize for their own self-serving interest. If that is all that is required in a case of public
comenience and necessity, the Public Service Commission has indeed lost its statutory jurisdiction and authority to the tourism council or various chamber of commerce groups throughout the state.
Salt Lake Transportation not only has failed to
meet its burden in showing existing carriers cannot
perform or are unwilling to perform or are incapable
of performing the service for which it applied and to
introduce with any particularity evidence on which the
Commission could base a finding as to any need, but
it blatantly and categorically stated that its application
was com1)etitive -..vith service being rendered by Conti1wntal. Mr. Boynton was asked:
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"Q. And you want to compete with them on tli··
charter business 1

°

"A. We want to compete with the Continrnta.
yes, sir." (R. 276).
r:L1his is a tacit acknowledgment on the part of Sal~.
Lake Transportation that its service is not unusual 1jJ
something that isn't being presently offered to the publi:
but that it intends to expand existing authoritv to
completely competitive with services already being oi
fered by carriers presently holding certificates of con
venience and necessity from the Commission.
111

Another serious question presents itself here wit!
respect to the investment made by Continental and othe1
carriers. Continental bases 25 buses in Utah and a~ o
December 31, 1965 had a Utah investment of $3,79-1:,230.~;
(R. 510, 596). Salt Lake Transportation, on the ot!H;
hand, would be using equipment already dedicated 11
other services (R. 287) or leasing equipment (R. 33!1
to perform the competitive service. The CommiRsiun
has arbitrarily refused to consider evidence as to ei
penditures of existing carriers and the consequenti:i
duplication and waste. Its findings cannot be snpporte l
1

1

The Order of the Cormnission must be set aside fo:
the reason that Salt Lake Transporation has not su:
tained its burden of proof so as to enable the Conuui 1
sion to find there is a public need for its service or thn
existing carriers are unable, or unwilling to perform tli
services in question.
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POINT III
'THE C01\11VIISSION'S ORDER IS UNLAWFUL, ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS IN THAT THE COMMISSION REFUSED TO RECOGNIZE AND TAKE
INTO ACCOUNT UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENCE
OF DAMAGE TO EXISTING CARRIERS AND
THEIR SERVICE BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE
GRANTING OF THE APPLICATION.

T\fr 8erge L. Campbell of Continental testified with
respect to Exhibits 40 through 54 (R. 584-599c). These
general!.) show the Continental system income and its
equipment and investment in the State of Utah, which is
considerable.

Continental bases 25 buses in Utah (R. 510); in
196!1 had revenues of $3,794,230.07 (R. 596); and had
D Utah imyroll of $525,480.43 (R. 597).
Of significance are schedules of net operating revenues and operating ratios in Utah. For the year 1961
the net operating revenue was $135,445.35, with an operR.ting ratio of 87.4% and bus miles operated of 2,464,885
( R. 585). For the year 1962 the net operating revenue
was $90,346.83, operating ratio 92.4%, bus miles operated of 2,634,223 (R. 587). For the year 1963 the net
operating revenue was $40,159.05, with an operating
ratio of 9G.5% and bus miles operated of 2,509,393 (R.
589), For the year 1964 the net operating revenue was
$GG,671.53, with an operating ratio of 94.7% and bus
rnilrs op0rated of 2,498,035 (R. 591). For the year 1965
the net operating revenue was $16,294.61, with an operatmh' r·atio of 98.7% and bus miles operated of 2,574,228
(R 5!)8).
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It can be readily seen that in 19G5 Continental hi,
Special Bus Revenues, which jnclude charter and trJii·
services, of $68,175.91. It derived at year end a w
operating revenue of $1G,294.Gl. 'l1he comparison of tlrl·:,
figures can lead to no other conclusion than the chartr:
services performed by Continental are of extrem(' iii
portance to it. Mr. Campbell testified that $8,327 tlila
revenue was directly attributable to Utah charters in tlir
year 1965 (R. 513). This is approximately 50% of tL
net profit Continental made in the State of u tah in 10G:
although obviously some expenses would be deducterl
from the gross revenue figures.
1•

Mr. Campbell testified that the operating ratioi
show:
"A. Well, they show that from year to year om
operating revenue is climbing all the time aml
our profits are becoming less for operating
the same amount." (R. 503).
He further testified:

"Q. And Exhibit 54 is a statement of the intra
state charters operated in Utah during 1965:

"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. At any time during 1965, Mr. Campbell,&1
your cornpames have to turn down a cha1
ter~

"A. No, sir, we did not. vVe had equipment avail
able at all times." (R. 504)
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The interest of Continental in this proceeding re1a1\:'i; to charkr 01wrations (R. 516). Revenues lost
because of Salt Lake Transportation certifications will
affed arnl darnag<> Continental.
'l1he <·vidcnce completely contradicts the Commis"wn's pnrported findings, that existing carriers would
uot lie detrimentally affected by the granting of the
applieat1on and the Order should be set aside.
CONCLUSION
The Commission has failed to make Findings on
essential elements to a case of public convenience and
necessity and the Commision is without the ability to
base Findings of a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity on evidence that has been presented.
'l'he Order of the Commission is, therefore, arbitrary, capricious, and unlawful and must be vacated,
annulled, and set aside.
Respectfully submitted,
SIDNEY G. BAUCOM
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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